>There are already well known quantum-resistant encryption schemes being deployed live in browsers, today. Crypto can just start adopting one of these schemes today, and we're still probably decades away from a QC that can factor the kinds of primes that crypto security uses.
It's very strange that some people act like switching over to a post quantum cryptography scheme is trivial. Did you watch the video I replied to, which is a talk by an actual quantum computing researcher?
I hadn't watched the video, but I cam away even more confused by your comment. The video, while very alarmist about the threat of QC, is also very explicit that switching to PQE is very easy. The whole point of the talk is "switching is easy, the costs are huge, start doing it today".
I also think the talk vastly overestimates the urgency of this, based on little more than marketing projections. The reality is that many of those claims are hugely optimistic, and ignore some fundamental difficulties. Mainly, the qubits / quantum gates being produced today are not at all as programmable as the logical qubits used in the theoretical results presented in those papers. So, even if they do achieve the projected marketing numbers, it's likely that they won't be able to run Shor's or Grover's algorithm on those QCs.
Not to mention, we've had many periods of flimsy encryption being used for important infrastructure, and it has not resulted in wide scale disasters. Of course we should be responsible and avoid this, but I think the doomsday scenario suggested is way overblown, even if it were true that a 1500 logical qbit programmable QC would be available in 2030.
It's very strange that some people act like switching over to a post quantum cryptography scheme is trivial. Did you watch the video I replied to, which is a talk by an actual quantum computing researcher?